Authentication System

Docklift uses a token-based authentication system (JWT) to secure the API and frontend.

Components

• Routes: backend/src/routes/auth.ts
• Middleware: backend/src/lib/authMiddleware.ts
• Origin checking: backend/src/lib/originCheck.ts (CORS + WebSocket)
• Frontend Context: frontend/src/components/AuthProvider.tsx
• Frontend API Helper: frontend/src/lib/auth.ts (getAuthHeaders, authFetch, fetchWithAuth)
• Database Model: User (email, password hash, role, passwordChangedAt).

Auth Flow

1. Registration:

   • POST /api/auth/register
   • Only allows registration if zero users exist (first user becomes admin).
   • Bootstrap secret required (header x-bootstrap-secret or body) — printed by install / backend logs / data/.bootstrap-secret. Never returned by a public API.
   • Bootstrap claim: exclusive fs.rename of data/.bootstrap-secret → .claimed-<random> (lib/bootstrap.ts). Only the winner may create the admin; losers get 403.
   • Secret is consumed only after successful user create; failed validation restores the claim.
   • Crash recovery: on boot with no users, recoverStaleBootstrapClaims() restores a leftover .claimed-* back to .bootstrap-secret so setup is not bricked.
   • Setup rate limit: /register and /setup-token use a stricter limiter (10 / 15 min) in addition to the general auth limiter.

2. Login:

   • POST /api/auth/login
   • Validates email/password (bcrypt, 12 salt rounds).
   • Returns a JWT token (7-day expiry) that includes a pwdv claim.
   • Rate limited via express-rate-limit on all /api/auth routes (100 / 15 min general).

3. Session Management:

   • Frontend stores the token in localStorage key docklift_token.
   • Always use authFetch() for protected APIs — it attaches the Bearer header and on 401 clears storage + calls logout() (registered from AuthProvider). Prefer it over raw fetch + getAuthHeaders().
   • AuthProvider.tsx validates /api/auth/me on page load and clears invalid tokens.
   • Password change invalidates old sessions: JWT must carry pwdv === passwordChangedAt.getTime(). Exact match (not iat comparison) — same-second reissue after password change works correctly.

Protected Routes

All routes except the following require JWT via authMiddleware:

• /api/auth/register, /api/auth/login, /api/auth/status (public, rate limited)
• /api/github/webhook, /manifest/callback, /setup (GitHub App flow)
  • Legacy /api/github/callback OAuth token exchange is disabled (install-id redirect only)
• /api/backup/restore-upload with valid setup token (fresh install restore; token consumed only after successful restore — see lib/setupRestoreAuth.ts)

Routes /me, /profile, /change-password all use authMiddleware (not manual JWT decoding).

SSE Authentication

Server-Sent Events (logs) use short-lived tokens instead of long-lived JWTs in URLs:

• POST /api/auth/sse-token → returns a 5-minute JWT with purpose: 'sse' (requires Bearer session JWT)
• Frontend uses this token as a query parameter: ?token=<sseToken>
• Middleware split:
  • authMiddleware: Authorization: Bearer session JWT only — no query tokens
  • sseAuthMiddleware: query ?token= with purpose === 'sse' only
  • SSE middleware is mounted only on:
    • GET /api/system/logs/:service
    • GET /api/logs/:projectId/stream/:containerName

Security Middleware

Located in backend/src/lib/authMiddleware.ts.

• authMiddleware: Bearer session JWT; rejects SSE-purpose tokens; never reads ?token=; rejects when pwdv is missing or does not match passwordChangedAt.
• sseAuthMiddleware: Query SSE token only; rejects tokens without purpose: 'sse'; same pwdv check.
• Setup-token path always uses config.dataPath (never a hardcoded ./data).

Security Hardening

• Error Sanitization: All catch blocks in auth routes return generic messages (e.g., 'Login failed'), never error.message.
• Security Headers: Custom security headers in index.ts (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, plus HSTS when the request arrived over HTTPS). Helmet is not used.
• CORS / Origin: Strict same-origin — scheme + host + port — via isTrustedOrigin(), plus any exact origins configured in CORS_ORIGIN. See the security_hardening skill for why hostname-only matching is unsafe here.
• Rate Limiting: Applied to all /api/auth routes.
• Terminal: WebSocket JWT + password re-verification (double auth). Session JWT only — SSE-purpose tokens are rejected on terminal upgrade.
• Host control-plane actions (/api/system/upgrade, update-system, reboot, reset, purge) and deployment restore (POST /api/deployments/:projectId/rollback): session JWT plus requireStepUpPassword body password. Canceling the password dialog must not call these APIs.
• Backup Downloads: Use fetch + Authorization: Bearer header + blob download pattern — never put JWTs in URL query parameters (prevents token leakage in browser history, server logs, and referrer headers).

Passwords

• Hashing: Uses bcrypt with 12 salt rounds.
• Reset: Admin password can be reset via CLI:

  cd backend
  bun run reset-password
  

Common Issues

• Infinite Redirects: Often caused by invalid token storage or clock skew invalidating JWTs.
• "Unauthorized" Loop: Frontend not clearing invalid token — clear localStorage.